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NOTES 
BLANKET POLICIES FOR STRIP SEARCHING 
PRETRIAL DETAINEES:  





In 2010, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third and Ninth Circuits 
joined the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in upholding the 
constitutionality of blanket strip search policies in correctional institutions.  
As a result, more government officials across the country can strip search 
arrestees and pretrial detainees as a matter of routine procedure without 
any reasonable suspicion that the detainees have contraband.  These 
detainees include individuals without criminal histories who are arrested 
for traffic or other minor offenses, and who have done nothing to suggest 
that they are attempting to smuggle contraband into correctional facilities. 
This Note recognizes that an objective legal analysis can be informed by 
relevant social science findings and relies on an interdisciplinary approach 
in analyzing the constitutionality of strip search policies.  Research has 
consistently found that strip searches are invasive, humiliating, and 
traumatizing even when conducted professionally and according to 
protocol.  At worst, strip search policies allow corrections officers to abuse 
their power and systematically perpetrate sexual violence toward detainees.  
Ultimately, this Note argues that blanket strip search policies are 
unconstitutional and that courts must only uphold strip searches when there 
is an individualized, reasonable suspicion that a detainee is concealing 
contraband. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The San Francisco Sheriff’s Department implemented a policy that 
required visual strip searches of all arrestees brought into its six county 
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jails.1  As a result, sheriffs strip searched numerous individuals including 
Mary Bull, who was arrested during a political protest.2  Jailors forcibly 
removed her clothing, left her naked in a cell for eleven hours, and 
subjected her to two body cavity searches.3  They released her after another 
twelve hours without any charges.4  Similarly, Leigh Fleming, arrested for 
disturbing the peace, underwent a body cavity search and was left naked for 
five hours.5  She was never charged with a crime.6  Charli Johnson, a third 
victim, was arrested after driving with a suspended license.7  Male officers 
forcibly strip searched her in a hallway and left her naked for twelve hours.8  
Like Bull and Fleming, Johnson was released the next day without any 
charges.9
On February 9, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
held in Bull v. City and County of San Francisco
 
10 that the policy of the San 
Francisco Sheriff’s Department did not violate these individuals’ Fourth 
Amendment rights.11  In so holding, the Ninth Circuit overruled its own 
case law,12 joining a circuit split created in 2008 by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Powell v. Barrett.13  Even more 
recently, on September 21, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit agreed that correctional facilities’ policies of strip searching all 
arrestees were reasonable.14  Together, these cases suggest a general trend 
of interpreting the Fourth Amendment to allow “[s]uspicionless, routine, 
mandatory strip search policies.”15
 
 1. Bull v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 966 (9th Cir. 2010). 
  The relevance of such a trend cannot be 
 2. Id. at 989 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 11. See id. at 966. 
 12. See, e.g., Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614, 615 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that jailors 
violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights by strip searching her after she was 
arrested for a minor offense and there was no reasonable suspicion that she had contraband 
or a communicable disease), overruled by Bull, 595 F.3d 964; infra notes 273–74. 
 13. 541 F.3d 1298, 1306–07 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (recognizing that other circuit 
courts have required reasonable suspicion in justifying strip searches, but declining to do so).  
In Powell, the Eleventh Circuit also overruled one of its prior cases. Id. at 1307; see Wilson 
v. Jones, 251 F.3d 1340, 1341 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that a blanket policy requiring strip 
searches of all arrestees admitted to the county jail was unconstitutional), overruled by 
Powell, 541 F.3d 1298; see also Bull, 595 F.3d at 980–81 (agreeing with the Eleventh 
Circuit’s reasoning that strip search policies do not violate the rights of arrestees who are 
mixed with the general jail population); infra Part II.B.1.  
 14. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 621 F.3d 296, 308 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
 15. Bull, 595 F.3d at 991 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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overstated in our post-9/11 society, in which concerns about security and 
the constitutional rights of individuals are particularly strong.16
Recently, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) wrote a letter to 
the Colorado Department of Corrections (DOC), arguing that a DOC body 
cavity search policy at Denver Women’s Correctional Facility violated the 
Fourth and Eighth Amendments.
 
17  Importantly, the letter also discussed 
the detrimental impact of the searches on the prisoners’ mental health.18  
Female prisoners stated that the invasive searches made them cry and 
worsened their prior traumas by causing flashbacks of prior incidents of 
sexual abuse.19  In addition, the letter suggested that the search policy 
threatened prisoners’ successful rehabilitations.20  To support this 
proposition, the ACLU cited social science sources to argue that 
traumatizing body searches will lead prisoners to refuse visits from friends 
and family, ultimately making the prisoners’ assimilation into society more 
difficult upon release.21
To date, law review articles discuss the constitutionality of strip search 




 16. Security and civil rights issues are relevant not only in a penological context, but in 
emerging debates about national security, technology, and virtual strip searches. See Petition 
for Review, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Napolitano, No. 10-1157 (D.C. Cir. July 2, 2010) 
(lawsuit filed by a nonprofit organization against the Transportation Security 
Administration’s (TSA) full-body scanner program, alleging that the program violates 
travelers’ Fourth Amendment rights); see also Susan Stellin, Are Scanners Worth the Risk?, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2010, (Travel) at 3 (listing the many concerns about body scanners, 
including their radiation levels, lack of thorough testing, and ability to save photos of 
travelers’ bodies); Gary Stoller, Debate Rages Over Full-Body Scans, USA TODAY, July 13, 
2010, at 4B (discussing the growing opposition to TSA scanners that “strip-search” 
passengers without probable cause to do so).  Furthermore, the advent of new technologies 
such as full body scanners allows correctional institutions and airports to conduct similar 
searches and cooperate with each other in doing so. See Christina M. Wright, Correctional 
Facility Uses Donated Airport Scanners to Detect Drugs, THE HERALD BULL. ONLINE (June 
24, 2010), http://heraldbulletin.com/local/x1617562558/Correctional-facility-uses-donated-
airport-scanners-to-detect-drugs (reporting that, after getting new equipment, the TSA 
donated seven machines that analyze microscopic particles from clothing and skin to the 
Indiana Department of Corrections). 
  However, 
 17. Letter from the Am. Civil Liberties Union to Ari Zavaras, Exec. Dir., Colo. Dep’t of 
Corr. 2 (Aug. 23, 2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Zavaras_ACLU_8-23-
10.pdf [hereinafter ACLU Letter]. 
 18. See id. at 2–3. 
 19. See id. (quoting a self-identified survivor of sexual trauma who stated that the strip 
searches encouraged her post-traumatic stress disorder and flashbacks, and that she observed 
women cry during searches); id. at 3 (“Prisoners at [Denver Women's Correctional Facility 
(DWCF)] have complained that the new breed of search exacerbates prior sexual 
trauma . . . .”). 
 20. See id. at 3. 
 21. See id. at 3 & nn.10–11 (citing various criminal justice, criminology, and therapy 
sources). 
 22. See, e.g., Andrew A. Crampton, Stripped of Justification:  The Eleventh Circuit’s 
Abolition of the Reasonable Suspicion Requirement for Booking Strip Searches in Prisons, 
57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 893, 893–909 (2009) (discussing the history leading up to Powell v. 
Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298 (11th. Cir. 2008); the decision itself; and post-Powell reactions from 
other circuits); Deborah L. MacGregor, Stripped of All Reason?  The Appropriate Standard 
for Evaluating Strip Searches of Arrestees and Pretrial Detainees in Correctional Facilities, 
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merely considering case law and legal standards ignores the very personal 
experiences and reactions of the detainees who are searched.  Strip 
searches, even when conducted professionally and privately, often cause 
feelings of disgust, annoyance, trauma, and humiliation, similar to the 
experiences of victims of sexual abuse and rape.23  Although prior legal 
articles rely only on judicial precedents, an objective analysis need not 
exclude detainees’ responses to strip searches.  Accordingly, this Note 
discusses the unresolved circuit split on blanket strip search policies in jails 
and prisons (when applied to pretrial detainees).  Moreover, this Note 
introduces into the literature extralegal factors relevant to such policies, 
including the psychological and social effects of strip searches.  This 
information will allow courts and others to reflect on strip searches not only 
as a means of preventing contraband in correctional institutions, but also as 
a potential form of power, control, and sexual violence systematically 
perpetrated by corrections officers.24
Part I of this Note provides a legal and social science background of strip 
search policies by discussing major Fourth Amendment cases, 
interdisciplinarity in the law, and social science research on strip searches.  
Next, Part II explores the circuit split on the constitutionality of blanket 
strip searches, describing the arguments for and against blanket policies.  
Part III assesses the opposing views of strip search policies in the context of 
relevant case law and social science literature.  It argues that, because the 
intrusion posed by a strip search is so severe, strip searches should only be 
conducted when a police or corrections officer reasonably suspects that a 
detainee is concealing contraband.  The justification for a strip search must 
be compelling enough to substantiate such an invasive procedure, and 
anything less than a reasonable suspicion should be considered insufficient. 
 
I.  STRIP SEARCHES OF PRETRIAL DETAINEES:  THE LEGAL AND SOCIAL 
SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 
Part I discusses case law and social science findings regarding strip 
search policies.  Part I.A focuses on the law of strip searches, beginning 
with the Fourth Amendment and its protections.  It then discusses the only 
U.S. Supreme Court case involving blanket strip searches of pretrial 
detainees, Bell v. Wolfish,25
 
36 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 163, 178–83 (2003) (arguing that courts should evaluate the 
constitutionality of strip search policies by combining the standards articulated in Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), and Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)). 
 and the Court's subsequent cases involving 
detainees' constitutional rights.  Next, Part I.B explains interdisciplinarity 
and considers its application in the legal field with specific examples from 
anthropology, family law, and community development.  Part I.B concludes 
by discussing the Supreme Court’s approach to interdisciplinarity.  Finally, 
Part I.C discusses the social science research on strip searches, including 
 23. See infra Part I.C. 
 24. See infra Part I.C. 
 25. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).  
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the effects of strip searches on individuals and the potential for abusive 
searches. 
A.  The Law Governing Strip Searches of Pretrial Detainees 
Part I.A provides a legal background of the constitutionality of strip 
search policies.  Part I.A.1 defines the term “strip search” as used in this 
Note.  Part I.A.2 discusses the Fourth Amendment and its protections, 
particularly involving searches of arrestees.  Next, Part I.A.3 examines 
Bell’s analysis of the constitutionality of blanket strip searches of pretrial 
detainees.  Finally, Part I.A.4 considers two Supreme Court cases decided 
after Bell:  Block v. Rutherford26 and Turner v. Safley.27
1.  Definition of “Strip Search” 
 
A strip search is “[a] search of a person conducted after that person’s 
clothes have been removed, the purpose usu[ally] being to find any 
contraband the person might be hiding.”28  Strip searches generally do not 
involve scrutiny of body cavities.29  However, policies in correctional 
facilities tend to include visual body cavity searches under the broad term 
“strip searches,” and only distinguish between visual and physical body 
cavity searches.30  This definitional problem is aggravated when courts 
describe strip search policies without clarifying whether a search includes a 
visual search of body cavities.31
In this Note, the term “strip search” refers to non-physical searches in 
which an individual removes all of his/her clothes while observed by a law 
enforcement officer, whether there is a visual body cavity search or not.
 
32  
The stated purpose for the removal of clothing is irrelevant.  Thus, for 
example, in Wood v. Hancock County Sheriff’s Department,33
 
 26. 468 U.S. 576 (1984). 
 the county 
argued that corrections officers only required Wood to disrobe in order to 
search his clothing, and “any observation of Wood’s naked body was 
 27. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).  
 28. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1469 (9th ed. 2009). 
 29. 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 259 (2010). 
 30. See, e.g., Bull v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 968 n.4 (9th Cir. 
2010).  The written policy at issue said:  “Strip searches include a visual body cavity search.  
A strip search does not include a physical body cavity search.” Id. 
 31. See, e.g., Stewart v. Lubbock Cnty., 767 F.2d 153, 154 (5th Cir. 1985) (simply 
stating that Class C misdemeanants “were strip searched at the Lubbock County jail pursuant 
to jail policy,” without providing the text of the policy or describing what the search entails). 
 32. See Kelsey v. Cnty. of Schoharie, 567 F.3d 54, 62 (2d Cir. 2009) (“The term ‘strip 
search’ is used generally to describe any inspection of the naked body.”).  Although a search 
involving disrobing and a manual body cavity search is also a strip search, the definition of 
“strip search” in this Note excludes manual body cavity searches.  Case law suggests that 
such searches may undergo a different legal analysis. See 16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law 
§ 1543 (2005) (“Because of the special insult to human dignity involved when the police 
seek evidence in body apertures . . . , special rules restrict internal body searches, and if the 
bodily intrusion is conducted by means so patently abusive as to shock the conscience, the 
search may violate due process.”). 
 33. 354 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2003). 
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incidental.”34  Nevertheless, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit held, the intrusion into individual privacy stems from having one’s 
naked body shown to and scrutinized by an official, regardless of the stated 
purpose for such exposure.35  In defining a “strip search,” this Note shares 
the view of the First Circuit that requiring an individual to stand naked 
before a law enforcement official meets the definition of a “strip search,” 
regardless of the official’s intentions.36
2.  The Fourth Amendment 
 
The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable searches by 
limiting the government’s ability to conduct searches.37  The text of the 
Fourth Amendment states, in relevant part:  “The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”38
The Fourth Amendment was “designed ‘to prevent arbitrary and 
oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and 
personal security of individuals.’”
 
39  Although courts initially construed the 
Amendment as protecting property interests rather than persons, they later 
found that it primarily safeguards individuals against invasions of privacy.40
a.  The Scope of Protection Afforded by the Fourth Amendment 
 
Having established that the Fourth Amendment protects persons, the next 
step is to consider the scope of protection available.  In Katz v. United 
States,41 the Supreme Court held that people are free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures regardless of their location.42
 
 34. Id. at 59. 
  In his oft-cited 
concurrence, Justice John M. Harlan agreed that the Fourth Amendment 
 35. See id. at 63–64. But see Kelsey, 567 F.3d at 63–64 (holding that a county jail’s 
clothing exchange policy did not violate the Fourth Amendment because incidentally seeing 
detainees’ bodies and genitals during a clothing exchange does not amount to a strip search 
or an unreasonable search).  However, in her dissent, then Second Circuit Judge Sotomayor 
wrote that the majority used the wrong version of facts and ignored key testimony by the 
plaintiffs. Id. at 65–67 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  She stated that although clothing 
exchanges may serve important objectives, they violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional right 
against unreasonable searches. Id. at 70–71. 
 36. Wood, 354 F.3d at 63–64. 
 37. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 38. Id.  The Fourth Amendment has been incorporated into the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, rendering it enforceable against states. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
 39. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984) (quoting United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976)); see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 
259, 266 (1990) (stating that historical sources suggest that the Fourth Amendment was 
meant to protect people from arbitrary actions by the federal government). 
 40. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967). 
 41. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 42. See id. at 358–59 (holding that the defendant was as entitled to his Fourth 
Amendment rights in a telephone booth as a person in a business office, apartment, or 
taxicab). 
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does not ask where a person is, but rather where a person can reasonably 
expect privacy.43  He articulated a two-prong reasonable expectation of 
privacy test:  first, a person must have “an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy,” and second, the expectation must be objectively reasonable by 
societal standards.44
In general, police must secure a warrant before conducting a search,
 
45 
and probable cause must exist before a warrant can be issued.46  However, 
the Supreme Court has established various exceptions to this rule.47  For 
example, in Terry v. Ohio,48 the Court upheld warrantless searches based on 
less than probable cause as long as the searches are based on specific facts, 
not vague hunches or good faith.49  This is based on the rationale that police 
officers engage in “necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot 
observations of the officer on the beat.”50  However, because the purpose of 
the Terry exception is to protect police officers and others nearby, the 
warrantless search must be limited to looking for potential weapons that can 
be used in an assault.51
b.  Searches of Arrestees 
 
In the years after Terry, the Court expanded the exceptions to the warrant 
requirement to arrestees and prisoners.  In Chimel v. California,52 the 
Supreme Court established that police officers can conduct warrantless 
searches of lawfully-arrested persons and areas within their reach.53  Such 
searches are justified by the need to protect the officer, prevent escape, and 
prevent the destruction of evidence.54  The Court in United States v. 
Robinson55 reiterated and clarified this holding, stating that during a lawful 
arrest, “a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search 
under that Amendment.”56
In Robinson, the police officer lawfully arrested the respondent, 
conducted a pat-down search, and felt an object through the respondent’s 




 43. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
  The officer reached in the pocket and retrieved a 
 44. Id. 
 45. See, e.g., Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999) (per curiam). 
 46. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”). 
 47. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009) (stating that a search 
incident to a lawful arrest is an exception to the warrant requirement); Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 
& n.19 (stating that there are “a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions” 
to the warrant requirement, and listing cases). 
 48. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 49. See id. at 21–22. 
 50. Id. at 20. 
 51. Id. at 29. 
 52. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
 53. Id. at 762–63. 
 54. Id. at 764. 
 55. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 56. Id. at 235. 
 57. Id. at 221–23. 
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crumpled cigarette package, which contained fourteen capsules of heroin.58  
Although the Court stated that such a “full search” is constitutional,59 a 
subsequent Supreme Court case made clear that the holding did not apply to 
routine strip searches of arrestees.60
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not shied away from cases 
involving strip searches of pretrial detainees.  Although the Court has 
adamantly recognized that prisoners have constitutional protections, it has 
also held that the effective administration of prisons allows for some 
curtailment of rights.
   
61
3.  Searches of Pretrial Detainees:  Bell v. Wolfish 
 
In the 1979 case of Bell v. Wolfish,62 the Supreme Court considered, for 
the first time, whether the Constitution protects pretrial detainees against 
strip searches.63  In Bell, detainees in New York City’s Metropolitan 
Correctional Center (MCC) filed a class action lawsuit challenging the 
constitutionality of over twenty institutional practices, including visual 
body cavity searches of inmates after they receive visits.64  Both the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York and the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the MCC had to justify its 
conditions under a “compelling necessity” standard.65  The Supreme Court 
disagreed, stating it could not find a source in the Constitution for such a 
standard.66
Instead, the Court held that the proper analysis is to determine whether 
the conditions at MCC were imposed to punish or to serve a legitimate 
governmental purpose.
 
67  Unless there is an express intent to punish, a court 
must consider if there is an alternative purpose for the restriction, and if so, 
whether the restriction seems excessive given this alternative purpose.68
 
 58. Id. at 223. 
  
The Court then held that the government has a legitimate interest in 
managing its correctional facilities, which includes maintaining security and 
 59. Id. at 235. 
 60. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646 n.2 (1983) (“We . . . do not discuss 
here[] the circumstances in which a strip search of an arrestee may or may not be 
appropriate.”); see also Katarzyna Homenda, Note, The Court is a Fan of Fans:  Johnston v. 
Tampa Sports Authority Correctly Refused to Extend the Special Needs Doctrine to Pat-
Downs at Raymond James Stadium, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 755, 775 n.170 (2008) (citing 
Robinson in support of the proposition that a full search of a person includes touching under 
his/her garments).   
 61. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974) (holding that “[t]here is no 
iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country,” but recognizing 
that institutional demands may diminish prisoners’ rights). 
 62. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
 63. Id. at 523–24. 
 64. Id. at 523, 528. 
 65. Id. at 530. 
 66. Id. at 532. 
 67. Id. at 535–38. 
 68. Id. at 538. 
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preventing weapons and drugs from reaching detainees.69  Thus, actions 
taken by corrections officers in furtherance of these objectives are valid and 
not intended as punishment.70  Taking this proposition one step further, the 
Court held that the need to run a correctional facility effectively can restrict 
individual rights.71  Accordingly, there is no distinction between pretrial 
detainees and convicted prisoners, because the nature of incarceration 
justifies depriving both groups of their full set of constitutional rights.72
Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the judiciary must defer to 
corrections officers and policies: 
 
[T]he problems that arise in the day-to-day operation of a corrections 
facility are not susceptible of easy solutions.  Prison administrators 
therefore should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and 
execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to 
preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional 
security.  “Such considerations are peculiarly within the province and 
professional expertise of corrections officials . . . .”73
However, the Court qualified that courts should default to their own 
judgment in cases with “substantial evidence . . . that the officials have 
exaggerated their response to these considerations.”
 
74
The Court then addressed the constitutionality of various MCC practices, 
including a policy requiring a visual inspection of detainees’ body cavities 
after every contact visit with a person from outside MCC.
 
75  In determining 
whether such a search is reasonable, the Court applied a balancing test and 
weighed the necessity of the search against the invasion of personal 
rights.76  It listed four factors to consider:  “the scope of the particular 
intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating 
it, and the place in which it is conducted.”77
Despite providing these factors, the Court did not clearly apply its 
balancing test to the MCC strip search policy.  Rather, it recognized that 
detention centers have “serious security dangers,” including the possibility 
that inmates will smuggle items into the facilities in their body cavities.
 
78  
The Court also acknowledged that strip searches are invasive and provide a 
potential for abuse by security guards.79
 
 69. Id. at 540. 
  Then, in an abrupt conclusion, 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 546–47. 
 72. Id. at 546. 
 73. Id. at 547–48 (citations omitted) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 
(1974)). 
 74. Id. at 548. But see id. at 568 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the necessity 
of imposing limitations on prisoners and detainees, but stating that the majority was “blindly 
deferring to administrative judgments on the rational basis for particular restrictions,” which 
“is an abdication of an unquestionably judicial function”). 
 75. Id. at 558 (majority opinion). 
 76. Id. at 559. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 560; see also infra Part I.C.1. 
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Bell held that visual body cavity inspections can be conducted on less than 
probable cause, without explaining what level of cause is sufficient to meet 
constitutional standards.80
While the majority made no mention of social science theories or 
testimony, both Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice John Paul Stevens 
did so in their dissents.
 
81  A psychiatrist testified that visual body cavity 
searches “placed inmates in the most degrading position possible.”82  This 
was consistent with inmates’ testimony that they feared sexual assault and 
forwent their personal visits to avoid being searched.83  There was also 
medical testimony that “inserting an object into the rectum is painful,” 
difficult, and uses more time and opportunity than inmates have during 
contact visits.84  Moreover, visual searches are unlikely to reveal the 
presence of objects in the rectum.85  Both Justices Marshall and Stevens 
agreed that visual body cavity strip searches are unnecessary and 
degrading.86
To date, Bell remains the only Supreme Court case to consider policies 
requiring blanket strip searches of pretrial detainees.
 
87  It is not surprising 
that the Court’s vague guidelines have caused lower courts to interpret the 
case in divergent ways.88
 
 80. Bell, 520 U.S. at 560.  Justice Lewis Powell stated that some cause, such as a 
reasonable suspicion, is necessary to justify anal and genital searches. Id. at 563 (Powell, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice Thurgood Marshall stated that courts 
should not consider whether a restriction is punitive, but whether the government’s interests 
outweigh individual deprivations. Id. at 564 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  Justice John Paul 
Stevens expressed a need for objective criteria, and urged for “careful scrutiny” when 
correctional facilities do not distinguish among detainees based on dangerousness. Id. at 588 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 
 81. Id. at 577–78 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 593, 599 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see 
also infra Part I.B.3 (analyzing Supreme Court Justices’ approaches to extralegal 
disciplines). 
 82. Bell, 441 U.S. at 577 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also id. at 593 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (stating that searches “engender ‘deep degradation’ and ‘terror’ in the inmates” 
(quoting United States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1977))). 
 83. Id. at 577 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 593 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 84. Id. at 578 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 577; id. at 599 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 87. See, e.g., Bull v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(stating that Bell remains a guiding case for strip search policies).  Two years after Bell, 
Justice William Rehnquist temporarily stayed a mandate by the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit to remand a case, after the Fourth Circuit held that strip searches cannot 
be conducted without probable cause. Clements v. Logan, 454 U.S. 1304, 1307–09 
(Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1981); see also infra notes 205–12 and accompanying text.  
Justice Rehnquist reiterated Bell’s holding that probable cause or a weapons- or drug-related 
arrest was not necessary to justify a strip search. Clements, 454 U.S. at 1309–10.  However, 
the Supreme Court later denied the application for stay and vacated Justice Rehnquist’s 
order. Clements v. Logan, 454 U.S. 1117 (1981). 
 88. See infra Part II. 
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4.  Supreme Court Cases after Bell 
The Supreme Court has not addressed strip search policies in detention 
facilities after Bell, but the Court has deviated from Bell’s four-factor 
balancing test in deciding subsequent cases involving detainees’ 
constitutional rights.  In Block v. Rutherford,89 pretrial detainees at the Los 
Angeles County Central Jail argued that several jail policies, including a 
blanket prohibition on contact visits, violated their substantive due process 
rights.90  After emphasizing the importance of deferring to institutional 
practices designed to maintain security and order,91 the Court upheld the 
prohibition because it rationally related to internal security.92
Three years later, the Court in Turner v. Safley
 
93 also used a rational 
relationship test, stating that “when a prison regulation impinges on 
inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably 
related to legitimate penological interests.”94  Four factors must be 
considered in deciding whether a reasonable relationship exists:  first, 
whether the government objective is legitimate and neutral, rather than 
arbitrary and remote; second, whether alternative means exist through 
which inmates can exercise their rights; third, the impact of accommodating 
these rights on guards, other inmates, and prison resources; and fourth, the 
absence of ready alternatives.95  These factors differ from those in Bell, and 
so it remains unclear what test applies when evaluating the constitutionality 
of policies in correctional facilities.96  The circuit courts still apply Bell to 
blanket strip search policies in jails and prisons, but reach different 
conclusions despite interpreting the same case and using the same balancing 
test.97
B.  Law and Interdisciplinarity 
 
Part I.A discussed the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment in regards to arrestees, pretrial detainees, and policies in 
correctional facilities.  However, relying solely on a legal perspective is 
insufficient for a thorough analysis of the constitutionality of strip searches, 
which are inherently personal experiences.  The study of law has been 
criticized for its “traditional preoccupation with doctrine,” and “accused of 
being rigid, dogmatic, formalistic, and close-minded.”98
 
 89. 468 U.S. 576 (1984). 
  On the other hand, 
interdisciplinary work has been “dismissed as substandard, superficial, and 
 90. Id. at 578. 
 91. Id. at 584–85 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 547). 
 92. Id. at 586. 
 93. 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
 94. Id. at 89. 
 95. Id. at 89–90. 
 96. See generally MacGregor, supra note 22, at 168–78 (reviewing in more detail other 
Supreme Court cases involving prisoners’ rights). 
 97. See infra Part II. 
 98. Douglas W. Vick, Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law, 31 J.L. & SOC’Y 
163, 181 (2004). 
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ill-informed,” and interdisciplinary researchers have been called “‘ivory 
tower dilettantes.’”99
1.  Interdisciplinarity:  Definitions, Advocates, and Critics 
  This section begins by defining and presenting the 
arguments for and against interdisciplinarity.  Next, Part I.B.2 discusses 
interdisciplinarity in the field of law and presents relevant examples.  
Finally, Part I.B.3 explores Supreme Court decisions that have considered 
extralegal disciplines. 
A discipline is “a ‘comparatively self-contained and isolated domain of 
human experience which possesses its own community of experts’ who 
share a distinctive set of ‘goals, concepts, facts, tacit skills, and 
methodologies.’”100  As such, a discipline has both scholarly and social 
traits, with its own body of knowledge, as well as members who share 
similar histories, goals, traditions, values, and ways of thinking and 
communicating.101  Because each discipline has a distinct identity, 
disciplines want to “protect their territories” and “preserve their traditions 
. . . into posterity.”102
Although the categorization of knowledge into disciplines has endured 
from ancient Greece to now, disciplines themselves have changed and 
evolved over time.
 
103  As disciplines specialized and grew apart from each 
other, scholars expressed the need for interdisciplinarity, though no clear 
consensus exists on how interdisciplinarity is defined or why it is 
necessary.104  Generally, interdisciplinarity is not merely a “transplant[] of 
methodology from one discipline to another,” though this occurs 
occasionally, but involves scholars considering a problem from the 
viewpoints of different disciplines.105
Advocates have listed numerous benefits to interdisciplinarity.  Some are 
merely practical, such as allowing scholars to distinguish themselves in 
competitive academic environments, get published in more prestigious 




 99. Id. at 186 (quoting Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal 
Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 36 (1992)). 
  More generally, collaboration 
promotes the creative combination of ideas and tools from different fields 
 100. Id. at 166 (quoting Moti Nissani, Fruits, Salads, and Smoothies:  A Working 
Definition of Interdisciplinarity, 29 J. EDUC. THOUGHT 121, 122 (1995)). 
 101. Id. at 166–68. 
 102. Id. at 169. 
 103. Id. at 166, 172. 
 104. Id. at 164–65 (discussing different definitions and descriptions of the term 
“interdisciplinarity”); see also JOE MORAN, INTERDISCIPLINARITY 15 (2002) (arguing that the 
ambiguity of the term “interdisciplinary” reflects its “flexibility and indeterminacy”). 
 105. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Pittsburgh, City of Bridges:  Developing a Rational 
Approach to Interdisciplinary Discourse on Law, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 199, 200 (2004) 
(discussing the development of a multidisciplinary discourse involving law, society, and 
economics).  However, when disciplines mix together successfully, the mixture may be 
routine and thus no longer considered interdisciplinary. Vick, supra note 98, at 172–73. 
 106. Vick, supra note 98, at 171. 
2734 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
when tackling complex societal problems.107  Interdisciplinary approaches 
can challenge outdated theories, produce innovative theories and methods, 
and foster creativity.108
Certainly, interdisciplinarity also poses challenges.  The term 
“interdisciplinarity” is vague and can be manipulated.
 
109  A practical 
manifestation of this problem occurs when universities downsize and cut 
costs by changing or merging disciplines, and then claim that the changes 
were made to embrace interdisciplinarity.110  Moreover, differences 
between disciplines, including different vocabularies and approaches to 
practice, may make it difficult to understand and assess the credibility of 
research across disciplines.111  For example, social scientists regularly 
critique each other’s methodologies, analyses, and conclusions in peer 
evaluations.112  However, this process may be construed by those outside 
the social sciences as criticism of weak research.113
2.  Applying Interdisciplinarity in Law 
 
Law is a unique discipline that does not rely on experimentation and 
quantitative data to discover new knowledge.114  Instead, law is created, 
interpreted, and enforced by lawyers, courts, and legislatures.115  Advocates 
of interdisciplinarity in law believe that merely considering the law is not 
enough.116  Rather, they argue, lawyers need to look to the social sciences 
and evaluate how legal institutions affect society and public values.117  On 
the other hand, some scholars feel that law must be clear and that 
complicating legal doctrines with other disciplines will undermine the law 
by fostering uncertainty.118
 
 107. Emily Bruusgaard et al., “Are We All on the Same Page?”:  The Challenges and 
Charms of Collaboration on a Journey Through Interdisciplinarity, 7 GRADUATE J. SOC. SCI. 
39, 43 (2010); see also id. at 44 (emphasizing flexibility and openness in interdisciplinary 
collaboration). 
 
 108. MORAN, supra note 104, at 182. 
 109. Id. at 182–84. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Bruusgaard et al., supra note 107, at 43. 
 112. Ronald Roesch et al., Social Science and the Courts:  The Role of Amicus Curiae 
Briefs, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 4–5 (1991). 
 113. Id. at 5. But see Vick, supra note 98, at 185 (stating that people may believe that 
scientific studies involving numbers are more conclusive than other studies). 
 114. Vick, supra note 98, at 177–79 (stating that the law is a closed system that requires 
considering only a finite group of authorities). 
 115. See id. at 177–78 (stating that lawyers primarily study what judges, juries, and other 
decision makers have done, then manipulate and present their cases according to those 
decisions). 
 116. Id. at 183. 
 117. Id. (discussing that legislators also may look to the social sciences in bringing about 
legal reforms). 
 118. See, e.g., Geoffrey Samuel, Interdisciplinarity and the Authority Paradigm:  Should 
Law Be Taken Seriously by Scientists and Social Scientists?, 36 J.L. & SOC’Y 431, 437 
(2009). 
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One worry about interdisciplinarity is that it may weaken the field of law 
or merge legal and nonlegal scholarship,119 which has occurred in 
anthropology.120  However, this is unlikely to occur because the legal field 
has a strong and stable disciplinary identity.121  As a result, other 
disciplines necessarily have a limited effect in the legal realm because laws 
can be repealed or changed.122  Moreover, written case law and rules guide 
the interpretation of laws, so weak or wrong interpretations can be refused 
or otherwise ignored.123
Still, judges and other legal scholars may be reluctant to rely on nonlegal 
disciplines because of the law’s sole emphasis on legal precedent, and 
because of unfamiliarity with social science methodologies and statistics.
 
124  
However, the successful implementation of interdisciplinary approaches in 
various legal forums undermines the hesitation of skeptical judges and 
scholars.  For example, in 1969, legal anthropologist Klaus-Friedrich Koch 
wrote about the relevance of anthropological research in three areas of law:  
the law of newly independent nations, laws in our contemporary American 
society, and international law.125  He concluded that lawyers must go 
beyond case law and statutes, and cooperate with social scientists to render 
law “an effective instrument of deliberate and guided change.”126
Another successful implementation of interdisciplinarity in law is the use 
of social science research on wills and people’s estate distribution plans in 
intestacy and family law.
 
127  Yet another example is the integration of law 
and social science in academia and training.  Fordham University’s 
graduate law and social work programs created an interdisciplinary 
domestic violence course.128  Researchers concluded that, compared with 
students who did not enroll in the class, students in the course increased 
their knowledge about domestic violence, harbored fewer myths and 
stereotypes about domestic violence, and showed increased positive 
attitudes about interdisciplinary work.129
 
 119. Vick, supra note 
  The researchers noted that 
domestic violence is by nature “a complicated, multisystem problem, and 
one profession cannot be expected to have all the knowledge and skills to 
98, at 186–87. 
 120. Samuel, supra note 118, at 440 (stating that anthropology has been described as 
losing its identity as a distinct discipline). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 439. 
 123. Id. at 441. 
 124. See Roesch et al., supra note 112, at 3. 
 125. Klaus-Friedrich Koch, Law and Anthropology:  Notes on Interdisciplinary Research, 
4 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 11, 17–21 (1969). 
 126. Id. at 20. 
 127. See Monica K. Johnson & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Using Social Science to Inform 
the Law of Intestacy:  The Case of Unmarried Committed Partners, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
479, 480, 497 (1998) (stating that such research can reach policymakers and, through them, 
change the legal and social climate for unmarried committed partners and their families). 
 128. Lisa Colarossi & Mary Ann Forgey, Evaluation Study of an Interdisciplinary Social 
Work and Law Curriculum for Domestic Violence, 42 J. SOC. WORK EDUC. 307, 307 (2006). 
 129. Id. at 318.  However, the authors of the article recognized that there could be a 
selection bias. Id. at 319–20. 
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intervene in a multidimensional way.”130  Thus, they concluded, 
professions should learn to work with each other to assist clients 
effectively, holistically, and readily, without being anxious about losing 
their identities or failing to dominate over other disciplines.131
As a final example, interdisciplinary collaboration also occurs in the 
Middle East to help communities end war.
 
132  Both law and social work are 
concerned about relationships, rights, and responsibilities, but law on its 
own may “disregard the everyday life experiences of individuals and 
communities that can be very different from acceptable norms as created by 
the State.”133  Because social work deals with individuals and communities 
deprived of their basic rights, social workers help when lawyers alone 
cannot organize communities against oppressive conditions.134  
Interdisciplinary practice centers in Israel, Palestine, and Jordan rely on the 
expertise of lawyers, social workers, doctors, accountants, and other 
professionals to attain goals such as teaching Islamic women about their 
rights, ensuring clean drinking water, and setting up food cooperatives.135
3.  Interdisciplinarity in Supreme Court Case Law 
 
As early as 1908, the Supreme Court in Muller v. Oregon136 relied on 
social science data to decide the constitutionality of limiting the number of 
hours that females work.137  Attorney (and later-Supreme Court Justice) 
Louis Brandeis submitted a brief compiling economics-based arguments 
along with reports and statistics of domestic and European committees, 
hygiene commissioners, and factory inspectors stating that long hours of 
labor were dangerous for women.138  While the Supreme Court recognized 
that these “may not be, technically speaking, authorities” in the legal field, 
they were still “worthy of consideration.”139
Since Muller, numerous cases have included social science briefs, 
including cases on the death penalty, homosexuality, abortion, jury size, the 





 130. Id. at 320. 
  Courts may be more open to an amicus curiae brief than to a 
 131. Id. 
 132. See Merav Moshe Grodofsky, The Contribution of Law and Social Work to 
Interdisciplinary Community Development and Peace Building in the Middle East, 15 J. 
COMMUNITY PRAC. 45 (2007). 
 133. Id. at 51. 
 134. Id. at 52. 
 135. Id. at 53–58. 
 136. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
 137. Id. at 417. 
 138. Id. at 419 n.1.  Legal briefs that contain extralegal analyses of statistics and other 
sources have become known as “Brandeis briefs” after Muller. See Danaya C. Wright, The 
Logic and Experience of Law:  Lawrence v. Texas and the Politics of Privacy, 15 U. FLA. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 409–17 (2004) (providing a history of the Brandeis brief). 
 139. Muller, 208 U.S. at 420–21. 
 140. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc. and 
Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders in Support of Respondents, Christian Legal Soc’y 
Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (No. 08-1371), 2010 WL 
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social scientist’s expert testimony because experts are hired by a party to 
testify, while brief writers are unpaid, usually work as a team with other 
groups or organizations, and cite their sources.141
The Supreme Court has gone beyond briefs to directly cite both legal and 
nonlegal sources relying on social science research.
 
142  A well-known 
example is Brown v. Board of Education,143 in which the Court cited six 
psychology sources which found that segregation promotes feelings of 
inferiority and is detrimental to children’s educational and mental 
development.144  More recently, in Maryland v. Craig,145 the Court, in 
holding that face-to-face confrontation of a child witness may cause 
significant emotional distress, relied on academic literature on the 
psychological trauma of child witnesses.146
Sometimes, Supreme Court Justices show skepticism towards the social 
sciences.  For example, in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District No. 1,
 
147 the Court held that basing admissions 
decisions in part on students’ race in order to have a diverse student body 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.148  
Although the plurality opinion did not cite social science sources, it 
discussed earlier cases, including Brown, when the Court referenced 
psychological findings.149  However, Justice Thomas in his concurrence—
though citing some nonlegal sources on student achievement in minority 
schools—stated that relying on social science evidence “would leave our 
equal protection jurisprudence at the mercy of elected government officials 
evaluating the evanescent views of a handful of social scientists.”150
 
989697 (homosexuality); Brief of Social Scientists, Medical Scientists, & Media Effects 
Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs. 
Ass’n, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010) (No. 08-1448), 2010 WL 3697191 (violent video games); 
Brief of Psychology Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Harjo v. Pro-
Football, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 631 (2009) (No. 09-326), 2009 WL 3359185 (disparaging 
trademarks); Roesch et al., supra note 
  He 
argued that Justice Breyer’s dissent overemphasized social science and 
112, at 1–2 (collecting cases with social science briefs 
on the other topics). 
 141. Roesch et al., supra note 112, at 4. 
 142. See Linda R. Tropp et al., The Use of Research in the Seattle and Jefferson County 
Desegregation Cases:  Connecting Social Science and the Law, 7 ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES & 
PUB. POL’Y 93, 94 (2007) (stating that the Supreme Court relied on social science research 
on sex role stereotyping in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) and on the 
beneficial effects of student body diversity in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)). 
 143. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 144. Id. at 494 & n.11 (citing books and psychology journal articles from the 1940s and 
1950s on the effects of discrimination and segregation). 
 145. 497 U.S. 836 (1990). 
 146. Id. at 855 (citing an amicus curiae brief by the American Psychological Association 
(APA) and a conference paper presented at an APA conference). 
 147. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 148. Id. at 711, 735. 
 149. Id. at 746 (discussing Brown’s holding that race-based segregation denotes 
inferiority, as well as other cases involving government classifications that “contribut[e] to 
an escalation of racial hostility and conflict” and “demean[] the dignity and worth of a 
person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities”). 
 150. Id. at 763, 766 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
2738 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
“would constitutionalize today’s faddish social theories” on segregation 
when the Constitution operates independent of such theories.151  Similarly, 
Justice Kennedy expressed concern that the dissent’s reliance on its 
“general conclusions . . . have no principled limit and would result in the 
broad acceptance of governmental racial classifications in areas far afield 
from schooling.”152  In addressing these criticisms, Justice Breyer noted 
that “[i]f we are to insist upon unanimity in the social science literature 
before finding a compelling interest, we might never find one.”153
Psychologists agree with Justice Breyer on the impossibility of having 
unanimous and completely objective social science findings.
 
154  They 
reason that social scientists, like everyone else, hold societal norms and 
standards which inevitably influence their theories.155  They “emphasize 
that recognizing some degree of subjectivity in our decision-making 
processes need not diminish the rigor of our work or the sound reasoning 
that underlies the conclusions we draw.”156
should allow [them]selves to be continually inspired by [their] morals, 
ethics, and values.  Indeed, it could be argued that the judiciary is 
successful precisely because it celebrates the best of these elements as it 
allows voices from the community to have input at the societal level.  
Thus, rather than attempting to eliminate values and subjectivity from 
[their] decision-making processes, [social scientists] should continue to 
ask [them]selves how [they] can thoughtfully and meaningfully blend the 
two.
  Rather, social scientists 
157
Supreme Court Justices may feel differently about integrating social 
science into their decision-making processes.  However, their divergent 
opinions will not stop social scientists from continuing to express their 
views and research findings in amicus curiae briefs and scholarly journals. 
 
C.  The Social Sciences on Strip Searches 
Given that there may be a place in the law for social science, Part I.C 
discusses the social science research on strip searches.158
 
 151. Id. at 780. 
  Part I.C.1 begins 
 152. Id. at 791 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 153. Id. at 845 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 154. Tropp et al., supra note 142, at 113. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 114.  Moreover, social scientists maintain that advocacy does not diminish 
science and research:  “[A] truly neutral brief is an elusive if not an impossible goal. . . . It is 
possible to be scientific without being neutral, to be objective yet form an opinion about the 
implications of the research.” Roesch et al., supra note 112, at 7. 
    158.  The research discussed in this section, and generally in this Note, only focuses on 
the effects of strip searches as conducted according to the policies in correctional facilities, 
assuming officers do not abuse their power in conducting the searches.  However, the 
potential for abuse exists and is a factor that courts may take into account when deciding the 
constitutionality of corrections officers strip searching all individuals upon arrest. See ALLEN 
J. BECK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN PRISONS AND JAILS 
REPORTED BY INMATES, 2008–09, at 23–24 (2010) (finding that at least four of every ten 
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by considering the general effects of strip searches on individuals, then 
discusses the targeted use of strip searches as a vehicle for racial 
discrimination.  Part I.C.2 considers the particular problems that strip 
searches create among females.  Finally, in light of courts’ deference to 
institutional settings like prisons and jails, Part I.C.3 examines the effects of 
implementing policies and routines in institutional settings like prisons and 
jails. 
There is a paucity of social science research on the prevalence and effects 
of strip searches on detainees in the United States.  Consequently, this 
section primarily focuses on studies conducted in Canada, Ireland, and the 
United Kingdom.  These studies are pertinent to the inquiry in this Note 
because the criminal justice policies at issue are similar to policies of 
American law enforcement agencies.159
Several reasons have been posited to explain the lack of research:  it is 
difficult to scrutinize police treatment of suspects in custody;
   
160 detainees 
may not report abuse out of fear or because of limited financial 
resources;161 and detainees may not want to relive the experience of a strip 
search.162  One woman stated:  “It was just the most horrifying thing that I 
have ever gone through and I could not tell my husband.  I could not tell my 
family, I couldn’t tell anyone.  It was such a traumatic thing to me I 
couldn’t even talk about it.”163
Moreover, police precincts and correctional institutions withhold 
information from the public.
 
164  There is little evidence of what occurs in 
correctional facilities, and the public typically only notices when egregious 
violations of individual rights are documented.  For example, in 1994, an 
emergency response team in the Kingston Prison for Women in Ontario, 
Canada, strip searched female inmates during a riot.165
 
victims of sexual misconduct by prison staff reported being sexually touched during a strip 
search or pat down). 
  Because the 
 159. Strip search policies are also a matter of concern for courts of other countries.  The 
Canadian Supreme Court held that strip searches are “inherently humiliating and degrading” 
no matter how they are carried out, and therefore cannot be used routinely. R. v. Golden, 
[2001] 3 S.C.R. 679, para. 90 (Can.). 
 160. See Tim Newburn et al., Race, Crime and Injustice?:  Strip Search and the 
Treatment of Suspects in Custody, 44 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 677, 679 (2004). 
 161. See Kyle Kirkup, Indocile Bodies:  Gender Identity and Strip Searches in Canadian 
Criminal Law, 24 CANADIAN J.L. & SOC’Y 107, 114 (2009) (stating that these problems are 
especially prevalent in minority populations, given the gross power imbalance between them 
and the police). 
 162. M. Margaret McKeown, Strip Searches Are Alive and Well in America, 12 HUM. 
RTS. 37, 42 (1985) (stating that detainees may not even tell their families about their 
experiences after being strip searched). 
 163. Id. 
 164. See MAEVE MCMAHON, WOMEN ON GUARD:  DISCRIMINATION AND HARASSMENT IN 
CORRECTIONS 178 n.6 (1999); see also James Barron, Times Sues City Police, Saying 
Information Has Been Illegally Withheld, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2010, at A29 (stating that the 
New York Times sued the New York Police Department for violating a state Freedom of 
Information Law that requires the Department to provide information to the press and 
public). 
 165. See MCMAHON, supra note 164, at 178 n.5. 
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searches were videotaped, there was extensive media and public attention 
which led to the establishment of a royal commission that examined related 
events at the prison.166  It is “suspect[ed] that if the videotape had not 
existed, or had not been made public, the incidents and their context would 
have, as is more generally the case, escaped systematic scrutiny.”167
1.  The Effects and Discriminatory Use of Strip Searches 
 
Being strip searched leaves people disgusted and annoyed, or worse, 
degraded, humiliated, and paralyzed.168  Victims may feel helpless, 
indignant, and shocked, and may experience, for several years, 
psychological symptoms of trauma similar to those endured by rape 
survivors.169  Even in prisons where inmates are strip searched so regularly 
that prison staff thought that inmates “got used to it,” the reality for many is 
that searches become “increasingly hard to bear,” and “serve[] a symbolic 
function of reaffirming imprisonment, shame, and lack of status.”170  
Feelings of humiliation and helplessness may be amplified if an arrestee 
exhibits physical manifestations of an illness or hormonal change, such as 
females who are lactating171 or menstruating,172 or arrestees who are 
otherwise perceived as different, including transgendered individuals.173
One study on the role of closed circuit television in a London police 
station emphasizes the potential for abuse and discrimination when police 




 166. Id. at 178 n.6. 
  From May 1999 to 
 167. Id. 
 168. See McKeown, supra note 162, at 37, 42; see also RUSSELL P. DOBASH ET AL., THE 
IMPRISONMENT OF WOMEN 204 (1986) (stating that female prisoners in Scotland felt that the 
benefits of receiving visits were outweighed by their feelings of degradation and humiliation 
after body searches). 
 169. McKeown, supra note 162, at 42 (“Post-search symptoms include sleep disturbance, 
recurrent and intrusive recollections of the event, inability to concentrate, anxiety, depression 
and development of phobic reactions.”). 
 170. DOBASH ET AL., supra note 168, at 204–05. 
 171. See Archuleta v. Wagner, 523 F.3d 1278, 1282 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating that the 
plaintiff lactated during the strip search, was not allowed to cover herself and instead was 
given a cut maxi-pad by the booking officer and a male jailer, neither of whom used gloves 
upon handling the pad). 
 172. See DOBASH ET AL., supra note 168, at 205; Linda Moore & Phil Scraton, The 
Imprisonment of Women and Girls in the North of Ireland:  A “Continuum of Violence”, in 
THE VIOLENCE OF INCARCERATION 124, 128 (Phil Scraton & Jude McCulloch eds., 2009); see 
also Jude McCulloch & Amanda George, Naked Power:  Strip Searching in Women’s 
Prisons, in THE VIOLENCE OF INCARCERATION, supra, at 107, 119 (stating that requiring 
women to remove their tampons and to squat and cough will not cause items concealed in 
the vagina to fall out, and that a contrary belief “reveals either a profound ignorance of 
women’s anatomy or an indifference to the stated purpose of strip searches in favour of a 
deliberate strategy to humiliate and degrade women”). 
 173. See Kirkup, supra note 161, at 107 (stating that a preoperative male-to-female 
transgendered woman who was arrested and strip searched in Ontario, Canada claimed that 
her requests for female officers to conduct the searches were denied and that she was 
subjected to a “split search” in which “male officers examined [her] ‘male’ lower body while 
female officers inspected her ‘female’ upper body”). 
 174. Newburn et al., supra note 160, at 679. 
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September 2000, officers in the station processed over 7000 arrests.175  The 
station’s policy allowed officers of the same sex to conduct strip searches 
only if they felt it was necessary to remove drugs or a harmful object.176
For each arrest, the researchers documented the detainee’s age, sex, 
ethnicity, and offense.
 
177  A statistical analysis of these factors revealed 
that, as expected, people arrested for drug offenses were the most likely to 
be strip searched.178  The results also showed that while all other variables 
(age, sex, and offense) were controlled, females were less likely to be strip 
searched than males, and arrestees who were seventeen to twenty-three 
years old were more likely to be strip searched than other age groups.179  In 
addition, ethnicity influenced whether a strip search was conducted even 
when all other variables were taken into account.  Specifically, compared to 
white Europeans, African-Caribbeans were twice as likely to be searched 
while Arabics and Orientals were half as likely.180  The researchers in the 
study concluded that the data at least “raise . . . the spectre of police racism” 
and reveal that “policing is unequally experienced,” though it is impossible 
to determine whether the disproportionate number of strip searches of 
African-Caribbeans is due to institutional racism or unintentional 
discrimination.181
2.  Strip Searches of Female Inmates 
 
This section discusses the effects of strip searches on female inmates.  
While the overall experience of convicted inmates serving a prison sentence 
is obviously different from that of an arrestee or pretrial detainee, the 
specific effects and psychological reactions of being naked and strip 
searched are likely similar among arrestees and inmates.182
 
 175. Id. at 679–80. 
 
 176. Id. at 679. 
 177. Id. at 681–83. 
 178. Id. at 688. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 688–89.  “White European” referred to “apparently-white British-born 
detainees, but may also have been used by the police to refer to someone born, for example, 
in Canada, France or Australia.” Id. at 681.  Similarly, the study did not distinguish between 
black Caribbeans and black Africans. Id. at 680–81 (explaining that ethnic classifications 
were based on police assessments of ethnicity, and that although these assessments may be 
inaccurate, they reflect the police officers’ perceptions of detainees’ ethnicities which 
ultimately influence treatment of the detainees). 
 181. Id. at 693. 
 182. An important distinction is that, unlike for arrestees, strip searches of inmates 
constitute one part of a total system of control and isolation, and thus may have more 
profound, negative effects. See McCulloch & George, supra note 172, at 112–13 (stating that 
routine strip searches in prisons discourage female inmates from seeing visitors and 
undermine prisons’ attempts to rehabilitate, counsel, and improve women’s self-esteem and 
skills).  In addition, strip search policies applied to inmates may perpetuate a vicious cycle in 
which drug-abusing inmates—who pose the greatest risk of smuggling drugs, syringes, and 
other contraband into prisons—may experience powerlessness, lowered self-esteem, mental 
anguish, and suicidal thoughts, which increase the need for drugs. Id. at 119–20. 
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Strip searches of women have been labeled as sexual violence and 
compared to rape.183  Only in correctional settings can officials claim to 
coerce someone into removing their clothing as part of their job, when the 
same coercion anywhere else would be a sexual assault.184  Psychiatrists 
have found that survivors of sexual humiliation often feel “shame and self-
blame,” which negatively impacts their feelings of “capability and 
autonomy.”185  In addition, female inmates who were strip searched 
expressed feeling objectified and deprived of their personhood, like “cattle 
in a market.”186  One woman said that the vulnerability, weakness, and 
anger inherent in being naked took away her will to fight back and caused 
her to prefer being beaten rather than strip searched.187
[T]hey literally had to pull the clothes off you.  That was embarrassing 
because you were kicking and struggling and they were ripping the 
clothes completely off you . . . .  You felt as if you were nothing, you feel 
degraded.  It’s like a rape of some kind.  They are ripping the bra and the 
panties off you [sigh] you felt like crying, you felt like rolling back in a 
ball and getting into the corner and never coming out of there again!
  Even if female 
prisoners do fight back and resist strip searches, it only makes the search 
more violent and reminiscent of a sexual assault, as one prisoner described: 
188
Being strip searched is particularly traumatizing for conservative, 
religious persons
 
189 and for domestic or sexual abuse survivors.190  Paula 
Richardson, a twenty-three year-old inmate in Australia, was raped several 
months before her imprisonment and strip search.191  Paula called her 
mother after the strip search, when she was “inconsolable with distress and 
kept saying ‘they’ve done it again, they’ve done it again.’”192
 
 183. R. v. Golden, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679, para. 90 (Can.) (stating that strip searches are 
described as “visual rape” and victims, particularly women and minorities, may experience a 
search as a sexual assault); Begoña Aretxaga, The Sexual Games of the Body Politic:  
Fantasy and State Violence in Northern Ireland, 25 CULTURE, MED. & PSYCHIATRY 1, 6 
(2001) (stating that the process of strip searching a female political prisoner “inscrib[es] the 
body . . . with the meanings of sexual subjugation through a form of violence that 
phantasmatically replicates the scenario of rape”); McCulloch & George, supra note 
  Paula’s 
mental well-being and behavior deteriorated after the search, as evidenced 
172, at 
109 (stating that prisoners experience strip searches “as a form of sexual violence or 
coercion”). 
 184. McCulloch & George, supra note 172, at 109. 
 185. Id. at 113. 
 186. Aretxaga, supra note 183, at 15. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 15–16. 
 189. McCulloch & George, supra note 172, at 114 (discussing the traumatizing effects of 
strip searches on Catholic women imprisoned in Northern Ireland).  Strip searches were also 
used to exploit and bring psychological harm to Muslim/Arab prisoners in Abu Ghraib. Id. 
(“Muslim victims of sexual torture forever carry a stigma. . . . [M]erely being stripped naked 
implies the breaking of a strict taboo, which leaves victims feeling extremely exposed and 
humiliated.”). 
 190. Id. (stating that strip searches can re-victimize women who were traumatized in 
incidents with men in the past); Moore & Scraton, supra note 172, at 128 (stating that 
women survivors of domestic abuse experienced additional trauma from strip searches). 
 191. McCulloch & George, supra note 172, at 116. 
 192. Id. 
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in her prison records and according to prison officials and her parents.193  
Six weeks later, she hung herself with a shower curtain in a cell; the coroner 
who investigated her death said that the strip search was unnecessary, 
invasive, and inappropriate.194
3.  Policies and Routines in Institutional Settings 
 
While no researcher to date has studied the effect of implementing 
blanket strip search policies in correctional facilities, a well-known 
psychology experiment suggests that such policies may lead to indifference, 
mistreatment, and even intentional harassment by officers.195  The 1973 
Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE) demonstrated the extraordinary influence 
of institutional settings by showing that even self-described college pacifists 
would, within hours of pretending to be prison guards, intentionally 
mistreat their peers who were pretending to be prisoners.196  Indeed, “the 
SPE underscored the degree to which institutional settings can develop a 
life of their own, independent of the wishes, intentions, and purposes of 
those who run them.”197  Thus, the environment outweighed the law-
abiding nature, caring personalities, and good intentions of the guards.198  
Instead, “[r]outines develop[ed]; rules [were] made and applied, altered and 
followed without question; policies enacted for short-term convenience 
bec[a]me part of the institutional status quo and difficult to alter.”199  The 
SPE researchers noted that this applies particularly to prisons, which can 
withstand strong pressures for change and escape outside scrutiny of their 
day-to-day operations.200  This view is bolstered by Bell v. Wolfish’s 
instruction for courts to afford wide-ranging deference to prison officials 
and policies.201
The SPE researchers argue that because prison settings can skew the 
judgments of administrators, people outside the prison system should be 




 193. Id. 
  The researchers call for 
psychologists and social scientists to more thoroughly examine social and 
policy issues in prisons, discard outdated theories on which criminal justice 
 194. Id. at 116–17. 
 195. See Craig Haney & Philip Zimbardo, The Past and Future of U.S. Prison Policy:  
Twenty-Five Years After the Stanford Prison Experiment, 53 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 709 (1998). 
 196. Id. at 710; see also id. at 709 (stating that the guards were so abusive that the two-
week experiment was stopped after six days). 
 197. Id. at 721. 
 198. Id. But see generally Thomas Carnahan & Sam McFarland, Revisiting the Stanford 
Prison Experiment:  Could Participant Self-Selection Have Led to the Cruelty?, 33 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 603 (2007) (finding, in a separate experiment using an 
identical ad used to recruit participants for the Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE), that 
volunteers for the study scored significantly higher on measures of aggressiveness, 
authoritarianism, narcissism, and social dominance, and lower on empathy and altruism, thus 
suggesting that there may be a selection bias that influenced the outcomes of the SPE). 
 199. Haney & Zimbardo, supra note 195, at 721. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547–48 (1979). 
 202. Haney & Zimbardo, supra note 195, at 721. 
2744 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
practices are based, and develop better alternatives backed by concrete data 
and creative ideas.203
II.  THE WIDENING CIRCUIT SPLIT:  THE REASONABLENESS OF BLANKET 
STRIP SEARCH POLICIES UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
 
As Part I discussed, Bell is the only Supreme Court case to date that 
specifically addressed the constitutionality of strip search policies involving 
pretrial detainees.  Part II describes the widening circuit split on this issue, 
and begins by discussing cases by eight circuits that interpret Bell to hold 
that strip search policies violate the Fourth Amendment.  Part II.B analyzes 
more recent opinions by three circuits that interpret Bell to hold the 
opposite.  Finally, Part II.C presents the social science arguments used by 
parties and amici curiae in the two most recent circuit court decisions. 
A.  Blanket Strip Search Policies Violate Fourth Amendment Rights 
The United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, 
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held that routine strip 
searches of pretrial detainees pursuant to correctional policies violate the 
Fourth Amendment when there is no individualized suspicion that the 
detainees have weapons or contraband.204
1.  The Circuit Courts’ General Bell Analysis 
 
Logan v. Shealy205 was the first federal appellate court case to hold that a 
strip search policy violated the Fourth Amendment.  Logan was arrested for 
driving while intoxicated and taken to the Arlington County Detention 
Center.206  She was released on her own recognizance but had to wait four 
hours before leaving unless someone picked her up.207  Logan was placed 
in a holding cell and strip searched pursuant to a policy requiring strip 
searches of all persons held at the Detention Center, regardless of their 
arrest charge.208  Within an hour after the search, Logan was released to a 
friend.209  Logan sued, alleging that the strip search policy was 
unreasonable and violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.210
The Fourth Circuit held that the Detention Center policy was 
unconstitutional under Bell:  Logan was not mixed with the general jail 
 
 
 203. Id. at 721–22. 
 204. See, e.g., Wood v. Hancock Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 354 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2003); Shain 
v. Ellison, 273 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2001); Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739 (8th Cir. 1985); 
Stewart v. Lubbock Cnty., 767 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1985); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391 (10th 
Cir. 1984); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983); Dufrin v. 
Spreen, 712 F.2d 1084 (6th Cir. 1983); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir. 1981). 
 205. 660 F.2d 1007. 
 206. Id. at 1009. 
 207. Id. at 1010. 
 208. Id.  The policy was instituted after a misdemeanant who was not strip searched shot 
a deputy. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 1011. 
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population and there was no indication that she had weapons or contraband, 
especially because she was not even frisked.211  The court concluded that 
“[a]n indiscriminate strip search policy routinely applied to detainees such 
as Logan along with all other detainees cannot be constitutionally justified 
simply on the basis of administrative ease in attending to security 
considerations.”212
Other circuits have also relied on a Bell analysis to hold that strip 
searches violated arrestees, and detainees’ Fourth Amendment right to be 
free from unreasonable searches.
 
213  Most of the cases involve plaintiffs 
arrested for traffic offenses and non-violent misdemeanors.214  In 
addressing the first Bell prong, the scope of intrusion,215 several circuits use 
strong language to describe the invasiveness of strip searches.  For example, 
the First Circuit stated that “visual body cavity [strip] searches ‘impinge[d] 
seriously upon’ Fourth Amendment values”216 and constituted “‘an offense 
to the dignity of the individual,’”217 and the Seventh Circuit described 
searches as “demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying, 
unpleasant, embarrassing, repulsive, [and] signifying degradation and 
submission.”218
In assessing the two Bell factors of the manner and place in which a 
search is conducted, courts note that blanket policies generally require 
searches to be conducted professionally and privately by officers of the 




 211. Id. at 1013. 
  Thus, strip searches in non-private areas, such 
 212. Id. 
 213. See, e.g., Watt v. City of Richardson Police Dep’t, 849 F.2d 195, 196 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(recognizing that an analysis of strip search policies both facially and as applied “begins, and 
practically ends,” with Bell). But see Stewart v. Lubbock Cnty., 767 F.2d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 
1985) (citing Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1271 (7th Cir. 1983), for the 
proposition that reasonableness cannot be precisely defined or mechanically applied). 
 214. See, e.g., Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 108 (1st Cir. 2001) (police arrested 
plaintiff Roberts based on an administrative error for an outstanding warrant which was 
actually withdrawn seven months earlier); Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 740 (8th Cir. 
1985) (plaintiff Jones was arrested on a warrant for refusing a summons after failing to leash 
his dog); Stewart, 767 F.2d at 154 & n.1 (stating that approximately one thousand strip 
searches were conducted each month pursuant to a blanket jail policy, including strip 
searches of a plaintiff arrested for public intoxication and another plaintiff arrested on a 
warrant for issuing a bad check); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 394 (10th Cir. 1984) 
(plaintiff was arrested on a warrant for a speeding ticket on his way to work at 7:30a.m.); 
Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1267 n.2 (three plaintiffs were arrested for traffic offenses and 
one plaintiff was arrested for a subsequently-dismissed disorderly conduct charge). 
 215. See supra text accompanying note 77. 
 216. Roberts, 239 F.3d at 110 (quoting Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997)). 
 217. Id. (quoting Wood v. Clemons, 89 F.3d 922, 928 (1st Cir. 1996)). 
 218. Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272 (quoting Tinetti v. Wittke, 479 F. Supp. 486, 491 
(D. Wis. 1979)); see also Jones, 770 F.2d at 742 (describing a strip search as “intrusive, 
depersonalizing, and distasteful”). 
 219. See, e.g., Roberts, 239 F.3d at 113; Dufrin v. Spreen, 712 F.2d 1084, 1087 (6th Cir. 
1983). 
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as a police station hallway, weigh strongly against a holding that blanket 
strip search policies are constitutional.220
Finally, courts consider correctional institutions’ justifications for 
conducting strip searches.
 
221  City and county governments state that strip 
searches help secure lockups by preventing the smuggling of weapons or 
contraband.222  Although institutional security is a legitimate government 
interest,223 circuit courts have held that the lack of a specific justification 
for strip searches outweigh a general interest in institutional security.224  
The courts also pointed out instances in which strip searches were blatantly 
unnecessary, including when plaintiffs were strip searched multiple 
times.225  Furthermore, though some policies may require strip searches 
only if detainees are intermingled with the general prison population, courts 
hold that intermingling is merely one factor among many to consider.226
2.  Requiring a Case-by-Case Analysis 
 
Unlike the Fourth Circuit in Logan, some circuit courts refrain from 
directly holding that a blanket strip search policy is unconstitutional.  
Instead, they emphasize that whether a strip search pursuant to jail policies 
violates Fourth Amendment rights depends on the circumstances.227
 
 220. See Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248, 1250 (6th Cir. 1989) (noting that the plaintiff, 
arrested for failing to appear in court after a judge’s administrative error of recording the 
wrong court date, was told to open her blouse for inspection in plain view of others and then 
strip searched on a different floor); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 394 (10th Cir. 1984) 
(stating that Hill was strip searched in the vicinity of almost a dozen people after he had 
already been frisked). 
  The 
 221. See supra text accompanying notes 76–77. 
 222. See Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272. 
 223. Roberts, 239 F.3d at 111. 
 224. See, e.g., id. at 111–12 (stating that detainees are unlikely to smuggle contraband 
when handcuffed and arrested spontaneously, and further stating that police officers can use 
less invasive searches such as a clothing search to look for contraband); see also Shain v. 
Ellison, 273 F.3d 56, 65 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that misdemeanants who remain detained 
because they do not post bail usually cannot afford bail, refuse bail, or had family court 
issues, and none of these reasons pose a reasonable suspicion that they have weapons or 
contraband); Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272–73 (holding that the city failed to show that 
women arrested for traffic or other minor offenses and who are in the lockups only to await 
bail pose severe dangers to the security of the lockups). 
 225. See Archuleta v. Wagner, 523 F.3d 1278, 1282 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating that 
Archuleta was frisked once at the scene of arrest and two more times at the detention facility, 
then strip searched even after the booking officer saw that Archuleta lacked the moles and 
tattoos described in an arrest warrant and told a receptionist “this isn’t her”); Roberts, 239 
F.3d at 108–09 (stating that Roberts was subjected to a visual body cavity strip search which 
revealed no contraband, but still underwent a similar search later that day); Jones v. 
Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 740 (8th Cir. 1985) (stating that Jones was subjected to a visual 
body cavity strip search at the jail despite the police arresting him from his home and after 
going upstairs with him while he dressed and used the bathroom). 
 226. See Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248, 1254 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that mingling 
with prison inmates weighs in favor of heightened security measures, but does not by itself 
justify strip searches without considering the offense or whether an arrestee has weapons or 
contraband); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 394 (10th Cir. 1984) (similar). 
 227. See, e.g., Archuleta, 523 F.3d at 1286 & n.5 (declining to adopt a bright-line rule for 
constitutional strip searches and requiring more fact-intensive inquiries with at least 
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need for a case-by-case analysis is particularly strong if a routine strip 
search policy is not carried out consistently.  For example, in Bull, despite 
being detained in jails that operate under the same detailed guidelines,228 
Mary Bull, Leigh Fleming, and Charli Johnson were all subjected to 
different procedures and even different types of searches.229  Similarly, 
corrections officers perform body searches in various ways, as detailed in 
the ACLU’s letter to the Colorado DOC.230  The DOC’s body cavity search 
policy at Denver Women’s Correctional Facility required prisoners to hold 
open their labia for inspection.231  One prisoner stated that officers perform 
the procedure differently, so that she has had to undergo the search “simply 
standing; from a sitting position with [her] legs spread eagle and having a 
flashlight shined at [her] genitals; from a standing position with a foot 
perched on a toilet and an officer’s face inches from [her] genitals.”232
In Watt v. City of Richardson Police Department,
 
233 the Fifth Circuit 
approved a blanket strip search policy facially but held that the policy was 
unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff, Lynda Watt.234  Watt was 
arrested on an outstanding warrant for failure to license her dog.235  She 
was cooperative and admitted to a minor drug conviction eleven years 
earlier,236 which the police would not have known about otherwise.237  
However, city policy required strip searches of detainees charged with or 
having a history of weapons, shoplifting, or drug charges.238
 
reasonable suspicion of weapon, drug, or contraband possession); Masters, 872 F.2d at 1255 
(holding that while a strip search is objectively reasonable for arrestees charged with violent 
crimes, it is not reasonable in traffic violations or other nonviolent minor offenses without 
any individualized reasonable suspicion of the arrestee having a weapon or contraband). 
  As a result, a 
 228. The written policy in Bull contains thorough instructions such as “[r]aise his/her 
arms above their [sic] head and rotate 360 degrees,” and “turn his/her head first to the left 
and then to the right so the searching officer can inspect the arrestee’s ear orifices.” Bull v. 
City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 968 n.4 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 229. The first sentence of the policy states that strip searches do not include physical body 
cavity searches. Id.  However, both Mary Bull and Leigh Fleming alleged that they were 
subjected to body cavity searches. See supra text accompanying notes 3, 5. 
 230. ACLU Letter, supra note 17, at 1–2. 
 231. See id. at 1. 
 232. Id.  On September 24, 2010, the Colorado Department of Corrections (DOC) issued 
a new regulation that no longer includes labia lifts, but requires women to lift their breasts 
and men to “lift genitalia and pull back foreskin of penis.” COLO. DEP’T OF CORR., 
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION NO. 300–06, SEARCHES AND CONTRABAND CONTROL 6 (2010).  
Inmates also need to turn their back to DOC officers, squat and cough, then bend forward 
and separate their buttocks for inspection. Id. 
 233. 849 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 234. Id. at 195.  Indeed, Kelly v. Foti, 77 F.3d 819 (5th Cir. 1996), characterized Watt as 
holding that officials can only strip search a minor offender who posts bond if there is a 
reasonable suspicion that the detainee has weapons or contraband. Id. at 821.  Kelly held that 
strip searching a woman arrested for making an illegal turn and driving without a license was 
not objectively reasonable. Id. at 822. 
 235. Watt, 849 F.2d at 196. 
 236. Id. at 196 & n.2 (stating that the conviction was set aside after Watt completed 
sixteen months of probation). 
 237. Id. at 196.  Additionally, police knew that Watt’s release was imminent because she 
called her neighbor for bail. Id. 
 238. Id. 
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female officer conducted a visual body cavity inspection of Watt.239  
Because the policy targeted specific classes of offenders thought to pose a 
threat to prison security,240 the Fifth Circuit held that it would justify 
certain searches.241  As applied to Watt, however, the court held that the 
search was “undeniably offensive” and thus unconstitutional given her 
minor offense, cooperative nature, sobriety, and minimal criminal 
history.242
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has also refrained from holding that blanket 
strip search policies are per se unconstitutional.  In Dufrin v. Spreen,
 
243 
Caroline Dufrin was arrested on a warrant for assault.244  She was taken to 
the Oakland County Jail, where she underwent a strip search pursuant to a 
jail policy that applied regardless of the offense.245  The court, relying on 
Bell, recognized that courts must give “wide-ranging deference” to prison 
policies and practices.246  Dufrin was charged with a violent felony and 
came in contact with the general jail population.247  The Sixth Circuit 
distinguished the case from other circuits that held blanket strip searches 
were unconstitutional when they involved minor offenses not usually 
associated with weapons and contraband.248  The court concluded that the 
Constitution does not require the sheriff to subjectively decide if a less 
intrusive search can be used based on the nature of the offense.249  
Accordingly, the court held for the defendant sheriff.250
B.  Blanket Strip Searches Do Not Violate Fourth Amendment Rights 
 
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits 
have held that blanket strip search policies of pretrial detainees, even absent 
individualized suspicion, do not violate the Fourth Amendment.  These 
cases will be discussed in chronological order. 
1.  Eleventh Circuit 
On September 4, 2008, the Eleventh Circuit decided Powell v. Barrett,251
 
 239. Id. 
 
a class action lawsuit brought by eleven plaintiffs strip searched at a 
 240. See id. at 197. 
 241. Id. at 198. 
 242. Id. at 199. 
 243. 712 F.2d 1084 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 244. Id. at 1085. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 1087 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)). 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 1088. 
 249. Id. at 1089. 
 250. Id.; see also Dobrowolskyj v. Jefferson Cnty., 823 F.2d 955, 958 (6th Cir. 1987) 
(upholding a strip search because the security interests are even stronger than those in 
Dufrin, since plaintiff Dobrowolskyj was arrested for menacing, an offense typically 
associated with weapons, and came into contact with the general jail population). 
 251. 541 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
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Georgia county jail.252  Five plaintiffs were searched as part of the booking 
process upon first entering the jail, even though police had no reasonable 
suspicion that any of them had contraband.253  The charges against the 
plaintiffs were revoking bail on a disorderly conduct charge, a traffic ticket 
warrant, driving under the influence, contempt for failure to pay child 
support, and a non-violent burglary.254  The Fulton County Jail’s policy 
required the arrestees to remove their clothes, take a group shower with 
thirty to forty other arrestees, and stand for visual inspections by 
deputies.255
The Eleventh Circuit analyzed the searches under Bell, rejecting the 
county and city defendants’ argument that the more deferential Turner v. 
Safley standard should apply.
 
256  The court held that Bell did not interpret 
the Fourth Amendment to require individualized reasonable suspicion 
because Bell involved a blanket visual body cavity strip search policy, not 
individualized searches.257  Furthermore, Powell held that other circuits that 
differentiate between felonies, misdemeanors, and lesser offenses like 
traffic violations in justifying strip searches were not faithful to Bell, which 
did not distinguish between detainees based on their arrest charges.258  The 
court stated that a minor offender may be a gang member attempting to 
smuggle contraband into the facility,259 or someone pulled over in a vehicle 
who had enough time to hide contraband on his/her person before an officer 
got to the car door.260  The court concluded that arrestees may be as likely 
to conceal contraband as inmates receiving contact visits.261
The Eleventh Circuit further analogized inmates after contact visits to 
arrestees during the booking process by stating that “an inmate’s initial 
entry into a detention facility might be viewed as coming after one big and 
prolonged contact visit with the outside world.”
 
262  It expressed that the 
plaintiffs’ “claims would not have a prayer of surviving even the most 
cursory reading of Bell” had they involved strip searches after a contact 
visit instead of during booking.263  The court then held that a blanket strip 
search policy applied to arrestees during the booking process did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment.264
 
 252. Id. at 1300. 
 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at 1301. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. at 1302; see also supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text. 
 257. Powell, 541 F.3d at 1307; see also id. at 1309 (stating that upon remand from the 
Supreme Court in Bell, the district court in the case must have recognized that reasonable 
suspicion was not required for strip searches, and then stating that other courts should 
recognize the same). 
 258. Id. at 1310. 
 259. Id. at 1311. 
 260. Id. at 1313. 
 261. Id. at 1314. 
 262. Id. at 1313. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 1314. 
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2.  Ninth Circuit 
As previously discussed, in Bull, the Ninth Circuit joined the circuit split 
created by the Eleventh Circuit.265  Jail administrators in Bull said that 
“based on their experience, ‘the greatest opportunity for the introduction of 
drugs and weapons into the jail occurs at the point when an arrestee is 
received into the jail.’”266  They also produced evidence that strip searches 
at the county jail uncovered seventy-three instances of illegal drugs and 
drug paraphernalia in arrestees’ body cavities between April 2000 and April 
2005.267  Drugs, drug paraphernalia, and weapons were found in body 
cavities even in cases involving minor non-violent offenses like public 
drunkenness and public nuisance.268
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the county jail policy under the guidance of 
Bell and Turner.
 
269  As in Bell, the strip searches of the plaintiffs were 
visual, professional, private, and done so to combat a serious contraband 
problem in San Francisco jails.270  The Ninth Circuit found that the facts of 
Bull and Bell were not meaningfully distinguishable and thus, respecting 
Bell’s mandate of deferring to corrections officials, upheld the strip 
searches as constitutional.271  The court stated that a Turner analysis leads 
to the same conclusion since the strip searches are rationally related to the 
legitimate governmental interest of keeping contraband out of jails.272
The court then discussed two of its earlier decisions, both of which held 
that blanket strip search policies of arrestees were per se unconstitutional, 
even if the arrestees were intermingled with the general prison 
population.
 
273  According to the court, these prior decisions were erroneous 
for four reasons:  (1) the judges substituted their judgment for that of 
corrections officials, (2) arrestees should not be distinguished by the 
severity of their offenses, (3) counties do not need to demonstrate an 
extensive history of smuggling incidents to justify a blanket strip search 
policy, and (4) such policies may deter arrestees from concealing 
contraband in body cavities.274  Ultimately, because Bell did not require 
individualized reasonable suspicion or statistical evidence to support a 
blanket strip search policy, the Ninth Circuit held that the San Francisco 
policy is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.275
 
 265. See supra notes 
 
1–13 and accompanying text. 
 266. Bull v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 967 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 267. Id. at 969 (stating that weapons were also found in body cavities). 
 268. Id. But see id. at 991 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that there was no empirical 
evidence that body cavity searches decreased the amount of contraband in jails). 
 269. Id. at 971 (majority opinion). 
 270. Id. at 975. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. at 976. 
 273. Id. at 977 (discussing Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 
1989), and Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam)). 
 274. Id. at 978–81. 
 275. Id. at 982.  The Ninth Circuit decided Bull solely on the grounds that a strip search 
policy can apply to all arrestees introduced into the general jail population, but not arrestees 
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3.  Third Circuit 
On September 21, 2010, the Third Circuit further widened the circuit 
split on the constitutionality of blanket strip search policies in Florence v. 
Board of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington.276  Plaintiff Albert Florence 
was arrested on a bench warrant for an offense punishable by a fine, which 
Florence had already paid.277  Florence was strip searched at the Burlington 
County Jail, then transported to the Essex County Correctional Facility six 
days later, where he showered before two corrections officers and was strip 
searched again.278  Both jails required Florence to lift his genitals, and the 
facility in Essex County further required him to squat and cough.279
The Third Circuit applied Bell’s four-factor balancing test.
 
280  First, the 
strip searches were less intrusive than the visual body cavity searches in 
Bell.281  The searches were conducted in private, under sanitary conditions, 
and by professionals.282  The justifications for the strip searches were 
different from those in Bell.283  Specifically, the jails’ security interests 
included detecting and deterring the smuggling of weapons and contraband 
into jails, identifying gang members from their tattoos, and preventing 
disease.284  The court held that, of the three, smuggling during intake posed 
the greatest security threat and was as strong as the interest in Bell of 
preventing smuggling after contact visits.285  Like the Eleventh and Ninth 
Circuits, the court stated that Bell did not require individualized suspicion 
and did not differentiate based on detainees’ offenses.286  Rather, the 
security risk posed by arrestees was inherent in their detention in a 
correctional facility.287  Furthermore, the court stated that individuals can 
plan their arrests in order to smuggle contraband or weapons, especially if 
courts forbid searches of certain groups of arrestees.288  The Third Circuit 
thus deferred to and agreed with prison administrators that blanket strip 
search policies decrease the subjectivity entailed in requiring reasonable 
suspicion to conduct strip searches.289
 
charged with minor offenses who remain at police stations. See Edgerly v. City & Cnty. of 
San Francisco, 599 F.3d 946, 957 (9th Cir. 2010). 
  The court held that the strip search 
 276. 621 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 277. Id. at 299.  The charges against Florence were ultimately dismissed. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. See id. at 306; see also supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 281. Florence, 621 F.3d at 307. 
 282. Id. (discussing the place and manner in which the searches were conducted, two of 
the four factors in Bell’s balancing test). 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. at 308. But see id. at 312 (Pollak, J., dissenting) (noting that both counties failed 
to present evidence of smuggling problems in their jails). 
 286. Id. at 308 (majority opinion). 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at 309. 
 289. Id. at 310. 
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policies in both New Jersey jails were reasonable and did not violate 
Florence’s Fourth Amendment rights.290
C.  Social Science Arguments in Briefs 
 
Although most of the briefs submitted to the Courts of Appeals in the 
cases discussed in Parts II.A and II.B did not include social science 
arguments, the appellant’s opening brief in Bull and several amicus curiae 
briefs in Florence referenced social science sources and findings. 
In its opening brief in Bull, the City and County of San Francisco argued 
that strip searches are necessary regardless of the offense committed 
because any arrestee can hide contraband on his/her body or inside bodily 
orifices.291  Moreover, any arrestee, even one charged with prostitution or a 
property crime, may be a drug addict, user, or otherwise connected to 
drugs.292  The City cited a research article which found that drug-using 
criminals are motivated to commit more crimes because they need money 
for drugs.293
Similarly, two amicus curiae briefs supporting the Burlington County Jail 
and Essex County Correctional Facility stressed the dangers that jailors 
face.  One amicus brief referred to a New Jersey government investigation 
of organized criminal street gangs in New Jersey prisons.
 
294  The report 
found that contraband confiscated in New Jersey prisons included drugs, 
weapons, cell phones, SIM cards, and money.295  The brief stated that not 
allowing jailors to identify gang members hinders their ability to safeguard 
the facilities.296
The Policemen’s Benevolent Association (PBA) also discussed the 
importance of identifying gang members and keeping rival gangs away 
from each other.
 
297  Citing the defendants-appellants’ brief, the PBA stated 
that identifying tattoos is a simple and reliable method of finding gang 
affiliations.298  They also listed a medical justification for strip searches, 
namely, to detect contagious diseases that manifest with abscesses, boils, 
and other external symptoms.299
 
 290. Id. at 312. 
  The PBA concluded that not allowing 
 291. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 15–19, Bull v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 
964 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 06–15566), 2007 WL 1302885. 
 292. Id. at 18. 
 293. Id. at 18–19 (citing ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON CRIME PREVENTION AND CONTROL, 
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON URBAN CRIME 25 (1972); Joseph A. Califano, Op-Ed., A National 
Attack on Addiction is Long Overdue, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1986, at A35). 
 294. Brief of Sheriff’s Ass’n of New Jersey et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Defendants-Appellants’ Brief on Appeal at 20, Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of 
Burlington, 621 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2010) (Nos. 09-3603, 09-3661), 2009 WL 5635568. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Brief on Behalf of Amicus Curiae Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n, Local 249 at 13, 
Florence, 621 F.3d 296 (Nos. 09-3603, 09-3661), 2009 WL 5635567. 
 298. Id. at 13. 
 299. Id. at 15. 
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strip searches leads to the “unconscionable” result of risking the health, 
safety, and welfare of corrections officials.300
In contrast to the amicus curiae briefs for the defendants-appellants in 
Florence, a brief in support of plaintiff-appellee Albert Florence extensively 
discussed the psychological impact of strip searches on detainees.
 
301  The 
Pennsylvania Prison Society (PPS) stated that the Third Circuit must begin 
its analysis by considering “the unique emotional and psychological 
ramification of forcing arrestees to remove all clothing and be visually 
inspected by a stranger.”302  After citing Supreme Court case law on the 
unique protections given to an individual’s interests in bodily privacy and 
integrity, the PPS noted that any detainee can experience the indignity of 
strip searches if reasonable suspicion is not required.303  The 
“dehumanizing search” may impact victims in the long-term as they 
experience sleeping problems, flashbacks, and other symptoms of 
psychological disorders.304  In addition, “strip searches can have an 
irreversible effect on personal identity:  ‘a systematic deprivation of privacy 
and dignity can weaken the individual’s sense of self’ . . . [which] may have 
the unintended consequence of ‘increas[ing] violent and irrational 
behavior.’”305  The PPS concluded its brief with a quote from The Brothers 
Karamazov about the feelings of degradation, awkwardness, guilt, and 
despicableness a character felt when forced to undress during an 
interrogation.306
This transcendent principle of our humanity—that strip searches are tools 
for humiliation and dehumanization—is that which animates the current 
state of constitutional law. . . . [W]e respectfully urge this Court to join 
the overwhelming majority of federal courts in recognizing that the 
unique psychological effects of strip searches visited upon any human 
being should be avoided in cases, like this one, where literally anyone 
could be the next target.
  Finally, the PPS referred again to the psychological 
effects of strip searches: 
307
 
 300. Id. 
 
 301. See generally Brief on Behalf of Amicus Curiae Pennsylvania Prison Society in 
Support of Plaintiff-Appellee Albert W. Florence, Florence, 621 F.3d 296 (No. 09-3603; No. 
09-3661), 2010 WL 341403. 
 302. Id. at 9. 
 303. Id. at 9–10 (citing Cruzan v. Dir. of Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); 
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Rochin 
v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)). 
 304. Id. at 11 (citing McKeown, supra note 162, at 42); see also supra note 169 and 
accompanying text. 
 305. Id. (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting David C. James, Note, 
Constitutional Limitations on Body Searches in Prisons, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1033, 1049–50 
(1982)). 
 306. Id. at 20. 
 307. Id. at 20–21. 
2754 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
III.  REMOVING BLANKET POLICIES AND SEARCHING FOR 
REASONABLENESS 
Part II described the circuit split regarding the constitutionality of blanket 
strip search policies as applied to pretrial detainees.  Because social science 
research shows that strip searches can cause serious psychological effects, 
courts must hold that blanket strip search policies are unconstitutional.  
Strip searches should only be conducted when a law enforcement officer 
reasonably suspects that a detainee has contraband.  Part III.A argues that 
more research on American detainees is necessary, since the bulk of social 
science research on strip searches is conducted overseas.  It also advocates 
for courts to use interdisciplinary views to inform their legal analyses.  
Next, Part III.B uses current social science research to apply the Supreme 
Court’s four-pronged balancing test from Bell v. Wolfish, and concludes 
that the justification for a search must be very strong to outweigh the 
extreme intrusion of a strip search.  Finally, Part III.C proposes several 
nonlegal remedies to ensure that strip searches are conducted in a non-
discriminatory manner and that detainees, especially trauma victims and 
females, are treated with care during and after a strip search. 
A.  A Call for Greater Reliance on the Social Sciences 
There are several barriers to conducting research on strip searches of 
arrestees and detainees who, unlike prisoners, may be released shortly after 
being booked and strip searched.308  Detainees may not want to discuss 
their feelings because they feel humiliated and traumatized, or because they 
want to avoid reliving the strip search.309  Moreover, the public generally is 
not concerned with police precincts and correctional facilities unless there is 
evidence of severe violations of individual rights.310  Correctional 
institutions are likely to withhold information from the public, and it is 
almost impossible to observe corrections officers’ daily activities and 
interactions with detainees.311
Despite these difficulties, more research into the prevalence and effects 
of strip searches is needed to ensure that current findings are reliable.  
Specifically, findings must be consistent over time and applicable to 
broader populations of detainees, rather than only those involved in a given 
study.  Currently, strip search studies are primarily conducted in Canada, 




 308. See, e.g., supra notes 
  While the criminal justice systems 
and policies of these countries are similar to those of the United States, only 
further research can determine whether overseas studies can be generalized 
to American policies and detainees.  Similarly, a study on the effects of 
strip searches in one American correctional facility may not yield the same 
2–9 and accompanying text (describing three detainees who 
were released twelve hours or less after being strip searched). 
 309. See supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text. 
 310. See supra notes 165–67 and accompanying text. 
 311. See supra notes 164–67 and accompanying text. 
 312. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
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results in a different facility in another part of the country.  Only continued 
research in different facilities and geographic locations can reveal whether 
the findings on discrimination, trauma, humiliation, and desensitization in 
strip search research are consistent across populations.313
However, research is not helpful if the courts turn a blind eye to it.  
Courts rightly defer to legislatures and administrative agencies to ensure 
that policies are reasonable and useful,
 
314 but they must draw a line 
between deference and willful ignorance of relevant research.  While judges 
should be skeptical about the validity and reliability of interdisciplinary 
research, there is no reason to dismiss social science or other disciplines 
outright as “faddish” or “hav[ing] no principled limit.”315  Interdisciplinary 
views can inform legal analysis, and courts that take into account a variety 
of reliable sources can make more reasoned decisions than courts that 
blindly defer to government agencies and legislatures no matter how 
egregious and harmful a policy may be.  Indeed, the fact that law 
enforcement officials may be desensitized to the harmfulness of strip 
searches suggests that courts need to weigh objective social science data 
when deciding an issue as intimate as strip searches.316
B.  A Call for Reasonableness:  Applying Bell’s Balancing Test in Light of 
Current Social Science Research 
 
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the government can curtail 
individual rights to maintain security in correctional institutions.317  In Bell 
v. Wolfish, the Court employed a four-factor balancing test, considering the 
scope of the intrusion, the justification for initiating the intrusion, and the 
manner and place in which it is conducted, to uphold a blanket strip search 
policy applied to pretrial detainees.318  The circuit courts have all applied 
the Bell test to cases when plaintiffs allege that strip searches violated their 
constitutional rights.319  However, the courts apply the test inconsistently, 
resulting in a circuit split on the constitutionality of blanket policies 
requiring strip searches of pretrial detainees.320
 
 313. See supra Part I.C. 
  This section will apply 
social science research to Bell’s four-factor balancing test, thereby 
providing a more uniform and objective application of Bell to strip searches 
of pretrial detainees.   
 314. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 315. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. V. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 780 
(2007) (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 791 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also supra notes 
151–52 and accompanying text. 
 316. See supra notes 202–03 and accompanying text. 
 317. See supra Part I.A.2–3. 
 318. See supra Part I.A.3. 
 319. See supra Part II.A.1, II.B. 
 320. See supra notes 87–97 and accompanying text.  Compare Part II.A, with Part II.B. 
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1.  Scope of the Intrusion 
Because Bell did not articulate the magnitude of intrusion posed by a 
strip search, there is little guidance for courts applying Bell’s balancing 
test.321  Circuit courts holding that blanket strip search policies are 
unconstitutional emphasize the extreme scope of intrusion posed by strip 
searches.322  In contrast, the Third Circuit found that a visual strip search, 
genital lift, and squat and cough were less intrusive than the visual body 
cavity searches in Bell.323  The Eleventh and Ninth Circuits have not 
explicitly broken down their analyses according to Bell’s four-factor test.  
Instead, they have held that the facts before them were indistinguishable 
from the facts in Bell, and therefore follow Bell’s holding that blanket strip 
search policies are constitutional.324
Clearly, additional research is critical in guiding the courts on this prong 
of the Bell test.  Judges alone cannot decide that one strip search procedure 
is less intrusive than another based solely on their own perceptions of the 
experience of undergoing a strip search.  For example, the Third Circuit did 
not state why lifting one’s genitals, squatting, and coughing is less intrusive 
than undergoing a visual body cavity search.
 
325  Indeed, the social science 
literature suggests that feelings of degradation and trauma would be similar 
among those who are strip searched, regardless of the specific actions that a 
detainee performs during a search.326  The process of having to strip naked, 
being observed, and being told to comply with different commands, while 
naked, appears to cause individuals to feel humiliated and ashamed.327  
Moreover, strip searches make detainees feel helpless and relive traumatic 
moments of sexual or physical violence.328  Such evidence shows that strip 
searches are extremely intrusive, and therefore can only be justified upon a 
higher showing of the three other Bell prongs.329
2.  Place and Manner of the Strip Search 
 
Courts must—and generally do—require that strip searches be conducted 
professionally, by an officer of the same sex as the detainee, and in a private 
 
 321. Bell did not clearly apply the balancing test to the strip search policy at issue in the 
case, but merely recognized the security dangers in the detention facility and the invasive 
nature of strip searches. See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text. 
 322. See supra notes 215–18 and accompanying text. 
 323. See supra notes 278–81 and accompanying text. 
 324. See supra Part II.B.1–2. 
 325. See supra text accompanying notes 279, 281. 
 326. See supra Part I.C. 
 327. See supra Part I.C. 
 328. See supra Part I.C. 
 329. Courts must be wary of being swayed by current events and trends, thereby going 
beyond the constitutional limits of reasonableness. See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 
392 n.4 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that this would go against the purpose of the 
reasonableness requirement, which was adopted to protect peoples’ privacy and property 
“even if a later, less virtuous age should become accustomed to considering all sorts of 
intrusion ‘reasonable’” (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 380 (1993))). 
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area.330  Given the serious nature of a strip search, a search conducted in 
any other manner or place should be presumed unreasonable.331
3.  Justification for the Strip Search 
   
The last prong of the Bell four-factor balancing test is the justification for 
the strip search.  Governments usually justify their interest in strip 
searching with the security of correctional institutions and preventing the 
smuggling of weapons, drugs, or other contraband.332  The circuit courts 
recognize that institutional security is a legitimate government interest.  
However, courts holding that blanket strip search policies are 
unconstitutional have found this interest outweighed by the lack of 
justification for strip searches in all cases, such as for handcuffed detainees, 
misdemeanants who cannot post bail, and people arrested for traffic or other 
minor offenses.333  On the other hand, the Eleventh, Ninth, and Third 
Circuits held that ensuring correctional facilities are secure and free of 
contraband justifies blanket strip searches.334
The justification for a strip search must be strong in order to outweigh the 
high scope of intrusion involved.
 
335  Thus, a law enforcement officer 
should only strip search a detainee suspected of concealing contraband, 
such as after a drug- or weapon-related arrest, or when a detainee’s criminal 
record includes recent drug or weapons possession.  Strip searches cannot 
be allowed on individuals arrested for traffic offenses or for non-violent 
misdemeanors that do not involve drugs.  Such a policy would ensure that 
arrestees like Mary Bull, Leigh Fleming, and Charli Johnson are not 
subjected to traumatizing strip searches after being arrested for minor 
charges like disturbing the peace, and when they lack criminal records 
suggesting they are likely to smuggle contraband.336
Moreover, corrections officers should not resort to strip searches if other 
resources exist to prevent detainees from smuggling contraband into a jail 
or prison.  For example, an arrestee in a single cell at a police station or 
county jail who is isolated from other detainees will not be able to smuggle 
drugs into the general prison population.  Such an arrestee need only be 
frisked, even if a small bag of drugs in a body cavity will go undetected.  
This is true even for individuals arrested for a drug offense unless police 
officers reasonably believe that they hid drugs in their body cavities.  As the 




 330. See supra note 
 it is unlikely that 
detainees will smuggle contraband when they are handcuffed and likely did 
219 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 270, 282 and 
accompanying text. 
 331. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
 332. See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 333. See supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
 334. See supra notes 259–63, 266–72, 284–85, 288 and accompanying text. 
 335. See supra Part I.C. 
 336. See supra notes 2–9 and accompanying text. 
 337. 239 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2001).  
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not plan their arrests.338
C.  Thinking Outside the Box:  Nonlegal Suggestions 
  Even if they did plan their arrests, they simply 
cannot smuggle contraband when completely isolated from other detainees. 
Research shows that giving police officers discretion to conduct strip 
searches may increase the chance of racial, gender, ethnic, or other forms of 
discrimination.339  However, preventing discrimination alone should not be 
enough to justify blanket strip searches that can psychologically damage 
thousands of detainees.  Corrections officers must be able to explain their 
reasons for subjecting individual detainees to strip searches.  Furthermore, 
other means exist to monitor police discrimination and abuse of strip search 
policies, such as installing closed circuit television in police stations.340  A 
less expensive alternative would be to monitor the records of police 
precincts and correctional facilities to ensure that strip searches are 
conducted only when there is reasonable suspicion that a detainee is 
smuggling contraband.  Though this may require more paperwork and 
decrease the efficiency of the corrections system, increased transparency 
may encourage officers to exercise more caution before conducting a strip 
search.  It may also encourage detainees to speak out if they feel 
discriminated against or otherwise abused during the strip search, so that 
others will scrutinize the accused police officers’ actions.341  Of course, 
these are not determinations for a court, but for a legislature or an 
administrative agency.  Again, this is a field that would benefit from 
research looking into effective ways to monitor discrimination and abuse in 
the corrections system.342
A final consideration for legislatures and agencies overseeing 
correctional facilities is to ensure that police and corrections officers are 
adequately trained in conducting strip searches.  Institutions within a county 
or city under the same strip search policy should make sure that strip 
searches are carried out consistently across detainees.
 
343  Policies should 
also specify procedures for common occurrences like menstruation or 
lactation among female detainees, or for strip searches of transgendered 
individuals, particularly in cities with a significant transgendered 
population.344
 
 338. See supra note 
  Additionally, officers should be aware of the psychological 
224 and accompanying text.  Similarly, expert testimony in Bell 
stated that there is not enough time and opportunity to hide contraband in a body cavity 
during a visit at a detention facility. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.  This is likely 
also true of individuals who are arrested and who did not plan their arrests. 
 339. See supra notes 174–81 and accompanying text. 
 340. This was done in Newburn’s research study that discovered that police officers who 
had discretion to strip search detainees exercised this discretion in discriminatory ways. See 
supra notes 174–81 and accompanying text. 
 341. See supra notes 164–67 and accompanying text. 
 342. See supra notes 159–67 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 308–13 and 
accompanying text. 
 343. See supra notes 228–32 and accompanying text. 
 344. See supra notes 171–73 and accompanying text. 
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damage sustained by those who are strip searched.345  Detainees, especially 
females, who violently resist, cry, or show other signs of trauma should be 
handled cautiously and, if possible, debriefed after the strip search 
procedure to ensure their mental well-being.346  This is particularly true if 
the female detainee is known to have suffered sexual violence in the past.347  
Moreover, officers should be cognizant that even repeat offenders do not 
simply “[get] used to” strip searches, and may actually find searches 
increasingly shameful and difficult to bear.348
Despite corrections officers’ important roles in safeguarding institutions 
while processing arrestees day after day, they must be reminded in periodic 
training sessions that the detainees they watch over are human beings 
entitled to basic levels of respect.  Supervisors and legislators who create 
policies receive wide-ranging deference from the courts, but their 
judgments may be clouded by the nature of working in institutional 
environments.
 
349  They should take an interdisciplinary approach when 
creating and implementing policies for precincts and jails, consult with 
specialists like psychologists and social scientists on the effects of strip 
searches, and use less invasive alternatives to finding contraband.350
CONCLUSION 
 
Because of the widening circuit split on the constitutionality of blanket 
strip search policies applied to pretrial detainees, more and more 
government officials across the country are stripping detainees as a matter 
of routine procedure without any reasonable suspicion.  Courts that uphold 
these blanket policies emphasize the security dangers in correctional 
institutions351 while turning a blind eye to the extremely intrusive and 
humiliating nature of strip searches.352  Even judges that are skeptical about 
the reliability of social science research cannot dismiss the unanimous 
findings to date that strip searches are like sexual assaults that can cause 
trauma and psychological harm to detainees.353
 
 345. See supra Part I.C. 
  Courts must recognize that 
an interdisciplinary approach and the use of social science research are 
necessary given the very personal issue at hand.  Incorporating 
interdisciplinary research leads to one logical conclusion:  blanket strip 
search policies must be held unconstitutional.  Strip searches are so invasive 
that individualized reasonable suspicion must be required each time an 
 346. See supra notes 183–88 and accompanying text. 
 347. See supra notes 190–94 and accompanying text. 
 348. DOBASH ET AL., supra note 168, at 204; see also supra note 170 and accompanying 
text. 
 349. See supra notes 195–203 and accompanying text. 
 350. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
 351. See supra Part II.B. 
 352. See, e.g., supra notes 301–07 and accompanying text.  The Third Circuit in Florence 
made no mention of the social science arguments in the amicus brief submitted to the court.  
See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 621 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2010); supra 
Part II.C. 
 353. See supra notes 168–73, 182–94 and accompanying text. 
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officer subjects a detainee to a strip search.  Holding otherwise would 
simply undermine the Fourth Amendment’s protections against 
unreasonable searches. 
 
